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Resumo:  
Analisando o papel desempenhado pelas restrições legais no controle do 
endividamento público em dois países presidencialistas - Estados Unidos e Brasil, o 
trabalho mostra que tais regras  não são  suficientes para reduzir os déficits e a dívida 
pública.  Para terem efetividade, elas dependem de certas condições políticas, como a 
coesão governamental. 
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Abstract 
Focusing on constitutional and legal restrictions over public indebtedness in two different 
presidential systems, the US and Brazil, this paper shows that they are not sufficient to 
reduce deficits or high levels of debt financing. To be enforced those restrictions depend on 
other institutional and political conditions such as government cohesion.  
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Institution-oriented approaches have come to emphasize the role of institutions in 
social life. Many empirical studies driven by new institutionalism have shown the effects of 
institutions over behavior, preferences and strategies of actors in economic and political 
activities (North,1981; Powell and DiMaggio,1991; Weaver and Rockman, 1993). Without 
denying these findings, the present paper stresses that some institutional arrangements such 
as constitutional or legal budgetary restrictions, have limited effects. Since they impose 
immediate and visible losses over relevant actors while their expected benefits are long-
term, diffuse and uncertain, they are hardly enforced. To be enforced they depend on 
political and other institutional conditions.  
According to Weaver and Rockman (1993)although institutions affect government 
capabilities, their effects are contingent and mediated by other institutional and non 
institutional factors. Thus, instead of speaking about the sufficiency of certain institutional 
arrangements, it is more appropriate to speak about opportunities and risks for any given 
capability which vary over time and across areas of public policy. In fiscal policy, as in 
other areas, the most important capabilities of government are loss imposing and priority 
setting.Many scholars have indicated that the  parliamentary system, despite some 
difficulties, especially in multiparty coalition cabinets,  offers more institutional advantages 
to enhance government capacities than the presidential ones (Linz & Stepan 1996; 
Weaver,& Rockman, 1993; Lever and Shelpse,1994). The existence of multiple veto points 
inhibits the ability to impose losses and to set and maintain consistent  priorities under 
presidentialism. Therefore, building government capacities is a greater challenge faced by 
politicians  in this latter system. 
Assuming that constitutional or legal restrictions over public deficit and 
indebtedness are not sufficient to achieve desirable fiscal outcomes, the purpose of this 
study is to analyze the political conditions under which those restrictions can be enforced in 
presidential countries. The main question is: What are the political conditions necessary to 
achieve  desirable fiscal outcomes in presidential systems during  hard economic times (of 
recession or hyperinflation)? Or,  using Weaver and Rockman' s terms, What kind of 
capability should governments have in order to set fiscal priorities and impose losses on 
concentrated interests? A possible answer to this question is government cohesion, as 
advanced by Schick (1993). In the paper I will  borrow his argument, analyzing the cases of 
two different presidential systems: the US and Brazil. 
How does one justify the comparison between these countries, considering their 
differences in levels of economic development and in their political systems? In general, in 
the comparative studies, the selection is based on similarities, such as OECD democracies, 
common post-authoritarian situations, etc. This is not the case here.  Even though 
presidentialism, federal system and a public debt to curtail are common situations among 
the US and Brazil,  this study will focus on the differences rather than on the similarities in 
their presidential and federal systems. Several studies have shown that formally common 
presidential and federal systems existing in these two countries actually work very 
differently. In Brazil, the legislative branch is much weaker and the federal model more 
centralized than in the US (Abranches,1988; Camargo, 1992).  In contrast to the American 
model  of full separation of powers, the Brazilian presidential system gives considerable  
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legislative power (through  provisional measures) to the president, who also controls a great 
part of budget resources (Mainwaring& Shugart,1997; Figueiredo e Limongi, 1997).  
Working very differently in each country, these systems have produced different 
situations of government cohesion over time (1) While the American system hardly 
presents government cohesion (especially in periods of divided government), the Brazilian 
presidential and federal systems have some devices which can induce more cohesiveness. 
Besides the  legislative power of  the president, the more centralized  federal system which, 
for example, concentrates the control of public indebtedness in the Senate, can also work in 
the same direction (2). 
Government cohesion is defined in this paper as the capacity of the president to set 
clear priorities, to have the main part of his agenda approved by Congress and  to 
implement his policies. In the Brazilian presidential system, the government cohesion also 
includes the capacity of the president of  having the provisional measures not disapproved 
by Congress. 
What are the conditions necessary for government cohesion? If institutional 
arrangements (such as parliamentarism or presidentialism, electoral rules, partisan fidelity, 
etc.) do matter, the level of cohesiveness of a government also varies according to 
contingent political factors. In the US, it depends on the frequency of non divided party 
control of the legislative and executive branches (Cox and McCubbins,1992; Schick,1993; 
Endersby and Towle, 1997) (3). In Brazil, it depends on the capacity of the president to 
build enduring coalitions among several parties in Congress, negotiating  ministerial 
positions and other political resources (Abranches, 1988; Amorin, 1994; Loureiro and 
Abrucio, 1999). Sometimes circumstances can also induce elite cohesion, such as the threat 
of  victory on the part of the opposition candidate ( a former unionist leader)  in the 1994 
Brazilian presidential campaign.  In addition,   to set clear priorities, consensus around 
some basic ideas is required  as well as the presence of a competent and internally coherent 
bureaucracy (4). The scheme below can help to make the relationship between the variables 
clearer: 
Institutional framework 
Contingent political factors            government      enforcement                          desirable 
Consensus around ideas         —>   cohesion   –––>            of           ––>                  fiscal  
Bureaucratic coordination             restrictions                          outcomes  
 
                                                 
1.Comparing fiscal outcomes in two different parliamentary systems,  Schick (1993) has also pointed out : "If 
Sweden and the Netherlands have taken different fiscal paths, it is at least partly because beneath the surface 
similarity of their cabinet governments, one country has been much more politically cohesive than the other" 
(p.188). 
2 It is useful to remember that the American system was built not to be efficient, but to prevent tyranny; on 
the contrary, the Brazilian presidentialism still maintains considerable authoritarian features. 
3 Even though they are affected by electoral rules, I assume that divided or unified governments in the US are 
contingent political situations since they can occur under the same institutional arrangement.  
4. In the context of this paper which stresses mainly the relationships between executive and legislative 
branches, these requirements were not taken into account.  
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Cohesiveness is a crucial capacity which enables government  to achieve desirable 
fiscal outcomes under adverse conditions. In the US, the absence of this capacity, due to 
divided governments, explains the high levels of deficit in the federal government, during 
the hard times of the 1980s and 1990s, as many authors have shown (5). In state 
governments, the increase of  debt levels, in the same period, even under constitutional 
restrictions, was also due to  mechanisms of power fragmentation (Briffault, 1996). 
On the contrary, the current Brazilian situation can be seen as an example which 
reinforces the argument that even under recession, governments with a certain level of 
cohesion are able to present some significant achievements in fiscal policy.  If   
hyperinflation was the price paid for the absence of government cohesion   
("ungovernability") during the first ten years of democratic governments (Sallum Jr. & 
Kugelmas, 1993), the monetary stabilization in 1994 was possible due to a new situation of 
elite cohesion (Abrucio e Costa, 1999). Recently, the severe fiscal adjustment imposed by 
economic difficulties has been possible due to the great effort  on the part of the Cardoso 
government to maintain the cohesion among their allies. (Couto and Abrucio, 1999; 
Loureiro and Abrucio, 1999). Table I in the appendix compares these different situations 
between the two countries over time.    
As regard to the empirical data used to analyze the American case, they were 
collected mainly in bibliographies and refer to federal and state restrictions over budgetary 
deficits and public indebtedness, during the 1980s and 1990s. In the Brazilian case, the 
study focuses especially on the political and institutional action of the Senate. According to 
the Constitution of 1988, the Senate has the exclusive power to control all financial 
activities on the part of federal, state and local governments. It authorizes credit contracts in 
the internal or external market, establishes limits over indebtedness, etc. The Senate has 
also been playing a singificant role in the Cardoso government cohesion. Besides 
supporting his administration politically, it has establised new fiscal institutions which 
improve the control of public debts and contribute to fiscal adjustement, central issue in the 
governmental agenda. The analysis refers to the period of great deterioration of public 
finances, since the implementation of the economic stabilization policies (the Real Plan), in 
1994. The main sources of data used in this part are documents and reports from the 
Brazilian Senate and other governmental agencies.  Some material published in newspapers 
was collected. Interviews with senators, their aides and with civil servants from the Central 
Bank and the Ministry of Finance were also included. 
It is relevant to mention that the effects of the public deficit over the economy are a 
controversial issue among different schools of economics. Budget preferences also vary 
among politicians, according to their ideological values and the political culture 
predominant in  each country (Benavie, 1998). In contrast to American conservative 
politicians who endure zero deficit, the European Union governments, in the Mastricht 
Treaty, for example, considered  investments (necessary to the economic development and 
expansion of the employment rates) as a legitimate reason for government borrowing. Even 
though they see the increasing deficits a threat, European leaders did not try to balance their 
                                                 
5. The current economic boom made possible what political and institutional conditions did not: not only a 
balanced budget, but surpluses. If desirable fiscal outcomes were generated even without government 
cohesion, and even without the enforcement of restrictions, the economic performance has saved politicians 
from hard choices only temporarily. When  fortuna vanishes,  virtú will be required.  
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budget. Thus, in a normative perspective,  what is expected from the governments is a 
capacity to manage  moderate deficits rather than insisting on zero deficits. Severe debt 
restrictions have been known to bring recession and unemployment, a process which  forces 
the government into more deficits. (Evans, 1997:.12). 
The paper is organized as follows: the first part analyzes the effects of constitutional 
restrictions on deficits and indebtedness  and how other variables affected fiscal outcomes 
in the US. The second part examines the role of the Brazilian Senate  in controlling the 
public indebtedness and in supporting the Cardoso administration.  As  ongoing  research, 
this paper does not present conclusions. It finishes with some general considerations   
derived from the  analysis in its present state.   
 
1.The control of the public deficit and indebtedness in the United States.  
1.1. Federal deficits in the 1980s and 1990s.  
For most of the 1980s and of the 1990s, the federal budget deficit has been a major 
issue in the American political agenda ( Wildavsky, 1988; White & Wildavisky, 1988; 
Brady & Volden, 1998; Benavie,1998; Evans,1997; Eastaugh,1994; Briffault,1996). 
"…(In) the late 1970s, congressional policy making has shifted from a 
policy regime where new programs — entitlements and others — were added and 
existing programs were expanded — to a policy regime where budgetary policy 
(focused on the deficit) encompasses and constraint all congressional policy" 
(Brady &Volden,1998).  
For that reason, in the last decades, there were several attempts to impose a balanced 
budget. All  failed. According to Schick (1993), during the 1980s, there was a " pattern that 
persisted throughout the decade. Steps were announced to reduce the deficit, and some 
were implemented. The president (and sometimes Congress as well) projected a declining 
deficit in the years ahead, but the actual deficit generally turned out much higher" (p.201).  
In 1981, for example, when Jimmy Carter's original budget showed a $16 billion 
deficit, the reduction agreements negotiated by president and congressional leaders turned 
that deficit into a project of $16 billion surplus. Nevertheless, the actual deficit for that year 
was $74 billion.During  the conservative  Reagan administration, despite the cutbacks and 
the ideological atmosphere of  “deficit hysteria” (Benavie, 1998), the attempts to balance 
the budget were not enforced either (6). The most significant example is the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, also called the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, 
enacted in 1985. Although long, it is interesting to quote Schick's analysis about the fate of 
this law: it was circumvented by different mechanisms and has completely failed. 
"The legislation was a by-product of protracted stalemate between the two branches. 
What   the president and Congress could not agree to do on their own would be done 
through the automatic sequester process. At least this was the script writ into law, 
though it did not quite work out as planned. Although the sequester was automatic, 
                                                 
6. As an example of "deficit hysteria" and the manipulation of public opinion around this subject by 
conservative politicians, one can mention the National Debt Clock on 6th Avenue in New York. The big panel 
shows the incessant growth of the governmental debt every second.  
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hardly anything else about the process was. The cutbacks could be averted(...); the 
targets could be changed; false savings could substitute  for real ones; spending could 
be loaded onto the previous year (...)In an era of extended budget conflict, the two 
branches managed to agree principally on one thing: that it is better to lie about the 
budget than to take the bitter medicine of deficit reduction "(p.207) (Emphasis mine). 
In 1990, the president and Congress negotiated a much  larger deficit-reduction 
package to alter the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law (7). It shifted the emphasis from 
controlling the deficit to controlling expenditure levels and revenue legislation. But again, 
this agreement had a number of loopholes and exceptions. Increases in the deficit or in 
spending due to economic conditions, emergencies and technical reestimates were empt 
from the new control  (Schick, 1993: 208). Like  the others, this agreement also failed.  
Despite all legal attempts to control and balance the budget, the federal deficits 
increased enormously, jumping from 79 billion dollars in 1981 to 290 billion in 1992. Until 
1995 the public debt in the US represented 70% of the GDP. Only after this period and due 
to the economic recuperation, the deficit was  reduced to the level of 50% ($3.6 trillion of a 
$7.2 trillion GDP) (Briffault, 1996).  
1.2.  Constitutional limitations in state governments: how they have been 
circumvented. 
As the states and local governments can not print money, they need to borrow since 
their expenditures are larger than their revenues. Otherwise they can not govern and 
provide public goods and services to citizens. In other words, the sub national governments 
in the US issue bonds when taxes and federal transfers or grants are not sufficient to 
maintain their programs and policies. For the investors, the incentives to buy governmental 
bonds come from tax exemptions.  
Unlike the federal government, most states are constitutionally prohibited from 
using deficit finance (8). Some constitutions bar state debt outright ( as in Indiana and West 
Virginia). Others impose different levels of limitation. For example, in the Arizona 
Constitution the aggregate amount of state debt shall never exceed the sum of $350.000 
dollars and the Georgia Constitution limits debt services to 10% of the revenue receipts ; in 
Nevada the debt limits are 2% of the state assets. Most commonly, debts may not be 
incurred without the approval of a majority of state voters in a referendum, or a 
supermajority vote in the legislature or both (Briffault, 1996: 43-75). 
The existence of these limitations in the state constitutions and that state debts are 
small (less than 7% of GDP in the beginning of the 90s) comparing to the federal debt 
(around 70% of GDP in the same period) helped to cause the idea that the state 
governments have balanced budget. They are examples to be followed by federal 
government (Briffault, 1996).  
                                                 
7. Schick has mentioned several situations in which this law was circumvented. He said, for example, that the 
original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law set the maximum deficit for the 1988 fiscal year at $108 billion; in 
1987, Congress reset the target to be $144 billion. The revised deficits target for the 1988-91 fiscal year 
totaled $228 billion more than the original targets (p.207). 
8 In general, state governments can issue bonds without limitations in case of war, invasion, etc. They do not 




Contrary to this belief — widespread mostly among conservative politicians — 
several studies have shown that the states use legal mechanisms to avoid the constitutional 
restrictions. Through these proceedings they actually borrow funds which are not 
considered as debt in the judiciary point of view.  
”The history of debt restrictions has been a chronicle of state fiscal ingenuity in 
developing new instruments for borrowing while persuading courts that these 
instruments do not create debt in the constitutional sense”(Briffault,1996:45).  
One important mechanism for circumventing constitutional restrictions is the 
creation of enterprises which operate out of the budget. They are called off-budget 
entreprises (OBEs). These corporations are set up by law in any state or municipality 
through simple procedures. For that reason, there are thousands of them all over the 
American territory. Pennsylvania, for example, has more than 2.500 OBEs. Operating in 
different areas such as the construction of bridges, roads, airports, etc., they raise funds 
issuing revenue bonds. As they do not rely on taxes to pay for these loans, but only on the 
earned tolls, the revenue bonds, and other kinds of non-guaranteed bonds, are not seen as 
debt. Consequently, their funds are not subjected to constitutional restrictions or  budgetary 
constraints nor  submitted to elected politicians control. (Bennett & DiLorenzo, 1982) (9).  
The OBEs and hence the revenues bonds have increased in the American financial 
market since the 1970s when state and local governments had their tax and expenditure 
power constrained by the movements called "tax revolts". In the federal government, off- 
budget activities also increased during the 1980s as a reaction against the pressures to 
balance the budget. Between 1974 and 1996, the percentage of revues bonds in the financial 
market jumped from 44% to 65%  (10). What is striking is that the expansion of off-budget 
activities is closely related to the limitations on taxes and on debts. The more fiscal 
restrictions, requiring a balanced budget, the more the off-budget enterprises increase. 
Although referring to the 1970s fiscal crisis, these words are very impressive: 
"Between 1972 and 1976, the proportion of nonguaranteed debt increased, on 
average, 5.6 percentage points in 'nonlimitation' states compared with 18 
percentage points in 'tax-limitation'states. So even though tax  and expenditure 
limits may have reduced  the growth of on-budget local expenditures, billions of 
dollars of debt and expenditures were placed off-budget through the OBE device" 
(Bennet & Di Lorenzo, 1982: 17)( 11 ).  
It is interesting to mention that the Council of State Government, an important state 
interest group, developed special kind of knowledge, training consultants to teach their 
clienteles how to circumvent the legal restrictions on debt. These kinds of skills are 
advertise as "new technologies" to enlarge the public services offered to the citizens by 
more "flexible" administrations(Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1982)  
                                                 
9. There are two kinds of bonds in the United States: revenue bonds and the general obligation bonds (G. O 
.bonds).The latter are guaranteed by taxes and included in the budget.   
10. The sources of these data are:  The Bond Buyer; Securities Data Company, Newark, NJ, Municipal New 
Issues Database, quoted by  Ferreira,(1998:42). 
11. More recently, other authors have also demonstrated that legal restrictions affect only the guaranteed 
debt but not the total  ( Nice, 1991).  
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These  legal "magics" or "legerdemain", as  Briffault calls them,  explain the growth of  
state debts, even under constitutional restrictions. According to the Book of States, 1994-
95, published by the  Council of State Governments,  the state debts jumped from  21.6 
billion  in 1962 to 372 billion  dollars in 1992. If in 1949 they represented   1.5% of GDP, 
this percentage was  6.2%  in 1992(Briffault, 1996). Hence, the constitutional restrictions 
were not effective incentives to control the public deficit. The main reason for that can  be 
explained  as followed: State constitutions generally do not penalize governors or 
legislators who fail to balance the budget.12 
Besides being inefficient, the constitutional limitations on public indebtedness also 
have negative consequences for public finances and for  democratic order. According to 
Briffault these consequences are:)a).Increase of borrowing costs, as far as interest rates for 
the non-guaranteed debts are higher; b) Strengthening the executive branch relative to the 
state legislative; c) debt restrictions can generate eventual imbalances instead of a balanced 
budget, as far as the state governments often borrow money from those public authorities 
created to avoid the legal constraints; d)reinforcement of the judiciary power, as far as the 
judges are becoming active actors in the fiscal policies.  
 
1.3. Political  conditions and the role of the market 
    If constitutional and legal restrictions are not effective or sufficient to control 
deficits and to limit debts, it is necessary to consider some political conditions and also the 
role of the market 
Several studies have stressed the role of political factors in generating different fiscal 
outcomes.  In the US the most striking aspect has been the divided government. Many 
authors argued that the recent history of divided government at the federal level has 
contributed to the growth of deficits (Cox & Mc Cubbins,1991; Brady & Volden,1998). 
Schick (1993) has stated, for example, that: 
 " While divided government has radiated to many areas of national policy, in 
none has the effect been more pronounced or protracted than the budget. Divided 
government clearly can reduce elite cohesion and increase the likelihood that 
mutual vetoes will lead to stalemate, exacerbating difficulties in priority setting 
that are inherent in the separation of powers....(It) unquestionably has impaired the 
capacity of the United States to deal effectively with budget deficits in the 
1980s."(op.cit, p.190-191) 
  Other studies have shown that divided and unified governments also affect the state 
budget policies and hence their debt burdens (Alt & Lowry,1994). Partisan control of 
governments and their ideological differences affect fiscal outcomes as well. These political 
factors work as a kind of filter through which constitutional restrictions are processed. 
                                                 
12 Several studies also concluded that other constitutional devices or budgetary controls such  as the line-
item veto rule, recission veto and legal limits on accrued debt, do not have independent significant impact 




 "States in which one party controls both governorship and the lower house in the 
legislature are more likely to respond quickly to unexpected deficits than their 
divided-government counterparts are"(Poterba, 1994: 818).  
"Unified governments in states that are not permitted to carry a deficit over into 
the next fiscal year react quickly to income shocks so that there is little deviation 
in the time path of surpluses or deficits. (...) The parties have different goals and 
react differently to changes in permanent expected levels of income, in ways 
affected by federal aid and the business cycle"(Alt & Lowry, 1994:812). ( 13) 
Financial market rules are also another mechanism for restricting debts. Besides 
being an instrument for financing public expenditures, the bonds also work as an 
instrument to control public indebtedness. Governments in need of loans should present a 
sound financial situation to get money from the market. Otherwise they do not have credit 
as happened to New York City during its fiscal crisis in the 1970s (Shefter, 1985). 
"If a state borrows too much money, financiers may simply refuse to lend 
more. States and local governments risk bankruptcies that the national government 
can avoid simply by printing additional dollars". (Peterson, 1995.p.3). 
In the US, this mechanism is extremely important to control public debt once the 
bond market became wide and very diversified. There are more than 58 thousand 
governments which can issue bonds. At the end of 1997 there were around 1.5 million 
bonds on the market, representing U$1.37 trillion dollars. Since the 1970s, the municipal 
bonds market in the US has experienced considerable changes such as the fluctuation of 
interest rates, the volatility of  bonds and the increase of the number of investors who are 
now best informed. After the 1980s, banks and insurance companies were no longer the 
main buyers of these bonds. Private investors represent nowadays more than 70%. 
(Ferreira, 1998; Zipf, 1995). The expansion of bond markets brought together governmental 
regulations which have established norms to protect investors. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), enacted in 1934 by Securities Exchange Act, controls the bond market 
through the Antitrust law and several other laws. In 1975, for example, with the default of 
New York City bonds, the American Congress enacted the Securities Act Amendments 
which allowed the punishment of dealers for bad behavior. It created the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) to supervise and regulate the municipal bonds and  
Congress  imposed the separation of fiscal responsability authority into several agencies 
(Shefter,1985). Security companies  that establish systems for classifying the risks of 
different state bonds are also a crucial instrument to control public indebtedness in the US 
(Zipf, 1995). 
  In sum, this set of information indicates that the absence of government cohesion 
may be a plausible explanation for the difficulty in obtaining desirable fiscal outcomes in 
the US.  Divided government (which reinforces the fragmentation of power, inherent in the 
system of full separation of powers) is viewed as responsible for federal deficits and for the 
high level of national debt during hard economic times. In the state governments, divided 
government and ideological partisan differences also play an important role in fiscal 
                                                 
13 Even taking into account arguments from authors who say "divided we govern" (Mayhem,1991) it is also 




outcomes. Other political factors contribute to the debt increase as well: the strengthening 
of the executive branch with the creation of quasi-autonomous agencies; the reinforcement 
of judiciary power which has had great discretion to review debt schemes; the absence of 
political power to punish the governments which fail to enforce constitutional budgetary 
restrictions, etc.  
 
 
2. Debt restrictions in Brazil: institutional and political dimensions 
2.1. The macro conditions of  legal restrictions  
  The total amount of public debt in Brazil (including federal, state, local 
governments and public enterprises) reached 35.8% of GDP at the beginning of 1998. At 
that moment, the public sector spent around 4% of the GDP to pay for interests. After the 
crisis at the end of 1998, this percentage jumped to 7.2%. Between January and August of 
1998,  Brazilian government (all levels included)  paid  more than 40 billion dollars as 
interest (14). 
The public deficit is considered the most important problem in the country 
nowadays. If its causes derived from structural factors and the model of intergovernmental 
relationship existing in the country (Sallum, Jr. 1996; Affonso, 1989; Abrucio e Costa, 
1998), its present deterioration is due to the increase of interest rates triggered by Central 
Bank since the implementation of monetary stabilization policies. The increase of the 
interest rate (currently the highest in the world) adopted by Brazilian policy makers has 
been an instrument to attract foreign money necessary to sustain the exchange rate — the 
anchor of the stabilization policy. The consequences of that have been harmful not only for 
individuals and enterprises but mainly for governments which finance their expenditures 
through indebtedness.  Between 1990 and 1995, the debts of Brazilian states rose 150%, 
mostly due to the increase of interest rates. According to data from governmental agencies, 
they accumulated a debt of 97 billion dollars, at the end of 1997. Out of 27 states, 22 owe 
more than they levy in one fiscal year. ( Folha de São Paulo,11/1/1998. P. A-6).  Besides 
interest rates,  personnel payment is the other important source of state deficit(15). 
However, the pattern of intergovernmental relationships existing in Brazil has made 
the solution to this problem very difficult. On the one hand, since the constitution of 1998, 
the states have had autonomy to tax, to set their administrative organizations, to adjust the 
wages of their personnel and to decide what to do with considerable part of federal transfers 
(Tavares, 1998) On the other hand, there is no fiscal responsibility among the state and 
local governments. They borrow without conditions of repayment, knowing that eventually 
the federal government will do it. Since 1988, there have been seven debt agreements 
between states and the federal government. The majority of them were not enforced by the 
                                                 
14. According to data from Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas and others published by  O Estado 
de São Paulo, 21.11.98. p.B2. 
15 Only 5 out of 26 states spend less than the legal limit of 60% of their revenue in payrolls. Some of them 
spend around 100%. Even with the reduction of the number of civil servants, the payrolls increase due to 
some automatic benefits provided by the Constitution of 1998 (Beltrão, Abrucio e Loureiro, 1998).  
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states. Only two obeyed the terms of negotiations. The worst  is that the states which did 
not honor their agreements were not punished  at all (Werneck,1998). (16) 
Even in the federal government — which is more pressured by international 
agencies, by the media and entrepreneurial areas and where there is a more consolidated 
consensus about the necessity of the fiscal adjustment — the process of controlling the 
public indebtedness is very hard and presents many moments of regression, especially in 
electoral periods.  
Conflicts between states and federal government have often occurred. For example, 
in January 1999 the state of Minas Gerais declared the moratorium of its debt to the federal 
government. Even though the total amount of this debt was not large, the situation caused a 
serious national crisis which pushed the Central Bank to devalue  the currency. 
During the last decades, the state governments could circumvent their fiscal   
problems through two main mechanisms: a) the so-called "inflationary" tax which allowed  
governments to extract revenue generated by the re-adjustment of civil servants' wages in 
lower levels  than the inflation rate and by the floating of creditors' payments; b) by 
borrowing from state banks.  As they appointed the heads of these banks, the governors 
could borrow money without any limitations on the repayment of the loans. This kind of 
loans, actually, constituted an important way to finance the state governments in Brazil 
until recently.    
Since 1994, the economic stabilization has caused considerable changes in 
intergovernmental relationships in Brazil (Abrucio,1998), strengthening the power of the 
federal government and reinforcing the authority of the Central Bank  (Sola, Garman e 
Marques, 1997)(17). Consequently, state governments lost those alternative sources for 
financing their expenditures: the rate of inflation dropped and the majority of state banks 
were privatized or simply shut down.  
Yet, the state governments still used another way to finance their expenditures: they 
issued bonds which were supposed to provide money to pay for judicial debts (the only 
possibility for indebtedness permitted by the new laws). The money, actually, was used for 
other purposes such as the payment of payrolls,  financing  electoral campaigns, and so on. 
With the end of this practice, the privatization of public assets has been the last alternative 
available for financing indebted state governments.  
 
2.2. Controlling the public indebtedness in Brazil: political and institutional action of 
the Senate 
                                                 
16. A journalist has well summarized the prevalent ideas around this behavior:"There is a general 
understanding that the fiscal adjustment is a problem of federal government, more precisely, of Ministry of 
Finance; and that state governments spend money for the people's welfare. When there is no money , a 
solution will always be found". (Sardemberg, 1998) 
17 Until recently,  the political manipulation of state banks was tolerated by the Central Bank because the 
federal government, which controls the Central Bank, needed the support of governors and of state 
representatives in Congress to have its agenda passed. In 1994, for example, the federal government bought 
very risky (or "junk") bonds from the state banks in a total amount of 5 billion dollars to guarantee the support 




Unlike in  the U.S, the Brazilian Senate has the constitutional power to control the 
public indebtedness for all levels of government. It establishes debt limits and conditions 
under which federal, state, local governments and public enterprises  borrow money in the 
internal and external financial market. To issue bonds or to contract any credit operation all 
governments and public enterprises need prior authorization from the Senate. Indeed, the 
most important part of the exclusive legislative action of the Brazilian Senate involves 
governmental debts. According to data collected in this house, between 1989 and 1998, 
around 80% of its resolutions involved debt authorizations or debt re-scheduling for 
federal, state, local governments and public enterprises. 
 The process of debt authorization works like this: after having the approval from its 
legislature, each government interested in issuing bonds should send a request to the 
Central Bank. The bank analyzes its technical conditions and sends a conclusive report to 
the Senate Economic Affairs Commission, recommending or rejecting authorization. 
Composed of 27 senators (representing different political parties, in their corresponding 
proportion on the floor), the Economic Affairs Commission has the central role in the 
decision making process. Its decisions have never been rejected by the floor. 
In recent years, the Brazilian Congress has been establishing more restrictive laws, 
reducing the limits on public indebtedness. In 1993, a constitutional amendment prohibited 
all governments from issuing bonds until 1999, except for the re-scheduling of former debts 
and the payment of judicial debts. As mentioned, this later alternative was mostly exploited 
by several sub-national governments as an additional (and irregular) way of financing their 
activities.  The irregularities were so big that the Senate set a Congressional Inquiry 
Commission to investigate them in November 1996. According to the report of the 
commission, the São Paulo City government, for example,  issued  1.1 billion dollar bonds  
above the total amount actually used to pay judicial debts   
What is most striking is that the governments were able to use this irregular 
procedure knowing the conniving behavior of the Senate and the Central Bank in face their 
fiscal irresponsibility.   In 1995, for example, all requests for debt authorization passed 
through the Central Bank departments and were approved by the Senate as the 
Congressional Inquiry Commission report has mentioned.  
Although nobody was punished by the irregularities pointed out by the Congressional 
Inquiry Commission, the scandal around over-issued bonds supposedly used to pay for 
judicial debts has produced an effect:  the enactment of more restrictive laws to control 
public indebtedness. Since 1990, the Senate has enacted four resolutions referring to this 
subject. Each one has been more restrictive than the last. Among the new rules (Resolution 
number 78,  enacted in July 1998),  it is interesting to stress the following: 1) the Central 
Bank should not send to the Senate any request for debt authorization if the government 
runs a primary deficit (which means the difference between revenue and spending, 
excluding the interest payments); 2)  no government can  offer any kind of  tax exemption 
and still be  able to receive debt authorization from the Senate; 3) the Senate also extended 
the prohibition against issuing new bonds until the year of 2010, except for re-financing the 
principal of former debts; 4) state governments with former debts re-financed by the Union 
are prohibited from issuing new bonds; 5) other procedures were adopted to make 
information about financial conditions of the issuer available at a lower cost to the public.  
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Thus, the Brazilian Senate has created a set of rules which  is extremely rigorous and 
commits itself to the control of public indebtedness (18) 
Yet, the new rules have not generated the desirable effects. On the contrary, always 
arguing emergency or exceptional situations, the senators have continued approving 
requests for debt authorizations, even after the enactment of new laws. According to data 
presented in table I, the debt authorizations have been oscillating over the period selected, 
probably due to different factors. Apparently the Senate resolutions have not influenced 
significantly this movement. For example, the number of authorizations for state 
governments increased in 1997, even after the enactment of more restrictive laws(19). In 
1998,  this number declined for the states and municipal governments, but increased for the 
federal government and for public enterprises (20).  
Table I - Evolution of the number of debt authorizations by the Brazilian Senate: 
1989-1998(*) 
Categories  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Federal 
Govern. 
  18     9      9    12    10    19     6    11   16   17 
State 
Govern. 
 34   38    34    30    29   43   31   52   75   57 
Local 
Govern. 
 14   15    13    25    68   16    9   20   16     9 
Public 
Enterprises 
 12     2      4      1      6     2    2     8      2    10 
   Total   78   64    60    68  113   80  48   91  109    93 
Source: Federal Senate 
(*) These numbers refer to authorizations for debts contracted in foreign banks, 
international agencies and in the domestic market. 
 
As a state representative, no senator rejects debt authorization for his state. Besides 
political interests, he can argue moral considerations such as the social welfare of the 
population, especially in the moments the states face such tremendous fiscal difficulties.  If 
he is not able to do so as a member of the Economic Affairs Commission, he negotiates the 
votes of his colleagues through the logrolling mechanism. 
How does one explain that the Senate enacts laws which it does not enforce?  Is it not 
really committed to the fiscal adjustment? Or is it simply an example of irrational behavior? 
                                                 
18. The prohibition against any bond from being issued for more than 10 years is an example.  According to 
some specialists on fiscal policies, the controlled expansion of bond markets would be a better alternative for 
public financing in Brazil as it occurs in the US. It would provide additional resources for governments 
necessary to improve social programs and indispensable investments without increasing tax burdens(Ferreira, 
1998). 
19 Unfortunately, due to calculating difficulty  data about the value in dollars of these debt authorizations 
could not be presented for the present. 
20. Recently, other authorizations were  also approved, as noticed by this newspaper::"In the midst of hard  
fiscal adjustments, under which the federal  government cuts spending as much as possible, a big feast 
happened in the Senate.... The senators approved a resolution which transfers to the Union a debt of 3.3  




It is more precise to characterize Senate's behavior as ambivalent rather than as simply 
irrational.  While the Senate does not apparently enforce its own restrictions over 
indebtedness, on the other hand there is much evidence of its commitment to fiscal 
adjustment, central issue in the governmental agenda of monetary stabilization. The most 
striking is the delegation of power to the Central Bank. Knowing their weakness of will to 
resist pressures coming from governors and other state representatives, the senators 
transferred to the Central Bank the capacity to decide about requests for debt financing, 
according to the article VII of the Resolution 78/98. They also established strict conditions, 
providing the bank officials with technical tools to reject  a great part of those claims.  
Examining debt authorizations after 1997,  in a more detailed way,  one observes 
that a significant number of them occurred as part of the debt negotiation process 
established between states and the federal government in the State Fiscal Adjustment 
Program. Through these negotiations, the Senate  authorized the re-scheduling of former 
state debts with the following condition:   states should  privatize their enterprises and,  in 
particular, state banks (21).  In 1996 there were eight authorizations as part of this program; 
in 1997 the number jumped to twenty-four authorizations, representing 32% of the total 
debt authorizations for the states.  In 1998,  there  were  sixteen,  corresponding to 28% of 
the total  (22). Thus, if debt authorizations approved as part of these negotiation agreements 
are taken out of the total, we would observe some reduction:  Instead of 75 authorizations, 
mentioned in table II, the number drops to 51 in 1997 and to 41 in 1998. In other words, the 
legal restrictions were enforced under specific political conditions: the bargaining between 
federal and state governments. This fact is significant, allowing us to analyze the Senate's 
behavior in a more comprehensive way.   
While still being sensitive to pressures coming from the states and local 
governments ( politically inevitable, considering the difficulties of their economic 
situations), the Senate has been working with the executive branch. It has constituted a 
pivotal support to the president, cooperating decisively with his policy of fiscal adjustment.  
Indeed, since 1995, the Cardoso governmental party coalition in Congress has 
passed  the majority of its agenda of state reform (23). In the Senate, in particular, the 
government majority is more striking: the five parties of the governmental coalition (PSDB, 
PFL, PMDB, PTB and PPR) have controlled more than 80% of the floor votes and 
approximately the same proportion of the votes in the commissions. Despite the absence of 
partisan fidelity and that government needs to bargain continually to maintain its allies, the 
                                                 
21 .With the federalization of their debts, which passed to the control of the National Treausury Secretariat, 
state governments obtained considerable advantages: besides the rescheduling  (around 30 years), the interest 
rates are lower (around 6% per year, while the Brazilian current rate is around 30%) and the annual limit for 
repayments was established around 13% of their net revenue.  
22 . According to Base de Dados da Legislação Brasileira. 
23 During the Cardoso first term (1995-1998), sixteen constitutional amendments were approved by 
Congress, most of them involving economic deregulation and fiscal issues. Another example of the 
cohesiveness of this government can be found in his capacity to reenact provisory measures: during his first 
term, Cardoso administration reenacted 405 provisional measures, while in the former ones, this number was 
much lower: 49 in the Franco government; 69 in the Collor government and 22 in the Sarney government. 
According to Couto &Abrucio (1999) the reenactment more than the enactment of provisional measures can 
be seen as evidence of the higher level of delegated power received by the Executive branch. It acts 
independently from negotiations in Congress: if not disapproved by the legislature, provisional measures are 
reenacted continually.  
 
15 
Congress has clearly supporting the Cardoso government agenda (Figueiredo e Limongi, 
1997). Thus, even experiencing some defeats, this government could build a relatively 
lasting elite cohesion which has allowed it to successfully pass its political agenda of state 
reform (Almeida, 1999; Couto and Abrucio, 1999). 
In the fiscal area, the most significant achievements have been the privatization of 
state banks and the re-scheduling of state debts. As indicated before, they constituted 
serious obstacles to fiscal adjustment in the country. Until 1998, out of thirty-three state 
banks  existing in the country, ten were privatized, eleven were shut down, and six were 
reorganized, according to data provided by the Central Bank. As regard to the re-scheduling 
(or "federalization") of state debts, out of  twenty-two indebted states, eleven had their 
debts re-scheduled in the same period.  
The Ministry of Finance has been playing a crucial role in the Cardoso government 
cohesion. Besides its traditional importance, as in any contemporary state, especially in 
hard economic times, the Brazilian Ministry of Finance has had its power reinforced in the 
current administration.  Stressing the fiscal adjustment logic, it has been able to control 
other ministries whose heads had been appointed as a result of partisan negotiations 
necessary to ensure congressional support (Loureiro & Abrucio, 1999). This control is 
performed by the power to release and withhold budgetary resources held by  the National 
Treasury Secretariat (STN), a department of the Ministry of Finance (24). It determines the 
pace of the implementation of policies established by other ministries, according to the 
needs of fiscal adjustment.   Moreover, the STN has a strategic role in the process of state 
debt re-scheduling. As a result of the federalization of state debts, the STN has centralized 
the public debt and, hence, all information about federal, state and local governments 
finances. The Ministry of Finance also exerts its coordination power in the Cardoso 
government  in an informal but relevant way. This occurs through the appointment of a 
great number of professionals connected to its economic team, as high officials in other 
ministries, as reported by several interviewees (Loureiro & Abrucio, 1999). 
Implementing the political agenda of fiscal adjustment, the Cardoso government 
was favored by the following institutional arragements:  the provisional measures, the 
Senate resolutions and the judicial decisions. If the conditions for state banks privatization 
and for debt re-scheduling (including penalties for the recalcitrant) were set through 
provisional measures, the Senate resolutions also provided the executive with more tools to 
adjust state finances. Besides the delegation of power to the Central Bank, already 
mentioned, other rules established by the Senate - such as the limits to future indebtedness 
not superior to the annual net revenue — also gave the federal government better conditions 
for bargaining with the states. 
Besides the Senate, the judicial branch has been also working with the executive 
branch, cooperating with its policy of  fiscal adjustment.  In cases of  conflict between 
states and the federal government, the courts have   decided in favor of the latter. They 
support their decisions on legal apparatus brought by provisional measures and Senate 
resolutions. The case of the moratorium of the State of Minas Gerais  in January 1999 is 
                                                 
24. The National Treasury Secretariat (STN) is a relatively new governmental agency created in the 1980s, 
during a process of restructuration of public finances in Brazil. Controlling all budgetary information and its 
output, this agency has greatly contributed to the reinforcement of the power of the Ministry of Finance inside 
the government and hence its role in the bureaucratic coordination (Loureiro & Abrucio, 1999).   
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exemplary not only of a new sort of intergovernmental relationships in contemporary   
Brazil, but also of government cohesion: challenged by the governor of that state, the 
National Treasury Secretariat of Ministry of Finance  blocked constitutional transfers, with 
the support of courts. The federal government  received the approval of the media and 
public opinion as well(25). In other words, while in the past states behaved as a sort of 
sovereign debtor in face the federal government, in the present  they have had incentives to 
repay their loans (Conklin,1998).  
Without passing judgment over the social effects of fiscal adjustment( in terms of 
unemployment and poverty levels), some instances of achievements in this area can be 
indicated. According to the Central Bank, at the end of 1999 the federal government had a 
29 billion dollar surplus, which represented 3.2% of GDP; in the state governments the 
surpluses were 3.5 billion dollars (0.3% of GDP). Yet, due to the high interest rates, the 
level of national debt was still  higher than in the previous year:  517 billion dollars, 
corresponding to  47.7% of GDP.  
In sum, if the legal framework provided by the provisional measures and by Senate 
resolutions was necessary to obtain the desirable fiscal performance,  political conditions  
made it possible to  turn Congress  and the courts from a position of potential veto points to  
allies of the executive branch, at least in regards to  fiscal adjustment (26). 
 
3. Final considerations:  
  Despite many differences, the US has shared a common fiscal behavior with Brazil: 
"it is better to lie about the budget ( and other fiscal rules) than to take the bitter medicine 
of deficit reduction". These countries have also shared the practice of inventing 
mechanisms to circumvent their constitutional and legal restrictions over deficit and debt. 
Of course it is not easy for elected politicians to vote for tax increases or benefit cutbacks; 
neither to limit financing possibilities necessary to provide public goods and services to 
their constituencies. Hard choices, however, are indispensable in hard times. Government 
cohesion is a condition for this. 
As the American system of full separation of powers and multiple veto points does 
not facilitate government cohesion, deficits are the most frequent results of economic 
recession. In the Brazilian post-1994 political situation, the same institutional framework of 
presidentialism and federalism, working differently, has generated, also under recession, a 
different outcome: some fiscal surpluses. In its case, the constitutional or legal restrictions 
over debts have produced the desirable effects, through government cohesion. Thus, we can 
acknowledge that political contingencies generate situations in which costs inherent in debt 
                                                 
25. The courts have also decided in favor of the executive branch in all suits brought by the opposition parties 
against the privatization of public enterprises (Almeida, 1999). On the other hand, one of the most important 
newspapers in the country approved the federal government action against   the state of Minas Gerais,   
publishing an article entitled: "The federal government weapons against the scofflaws" (O Estado de São 
Paulo, 7/1/1999, p.A3). 
26.In  regard to the social security system, for example, the government proposal for a constitutional 
amendment was not passed in Congress and other measures in the same area were considered unconstitutional 




or deficit restrictions are transformed into political benefits such as a lasting monetary 
stabilization, the increase of foreign investments flows, etc. 
Yet, the fact that those restrictions are not enforced does not matter in the US 
because, unlike Brazil until recently, there is no bailouts of the central government and the 
financial market controls the level of public indebtedness, especially in the subnational 
governments. Thus the present analysis allows us to distinguish two types of public debt 
control: a) the decentralized control, characterized by the American case; b) the political or 
authoritative control, characterized by the Brazilian case and other Latin American 
countries (Dillinger, Perry & Webb, 2000). 
On the other hand, we also can ask why those restrictions are established, 
considering that the costs of their enforcement are higher than their potential and uncertain 
benefits?. A possible answer to that question can be borrowed from Calvert and Johnson's 
analysis about constitutional making. According to them, besides legitimating decisions, 
constitutions are also necessary to create patterns for future behavior ( Calvert and Johnson, 
1997: 29), Thus, deficit and debt restrictions could be interpreted as devices available for 
future circumstances which are unpredictable in advance. In other words, they should be 
understood not only by the outcomes they prescribe but also by the future political uses of 
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